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THE BUSINESS FALLOUT FROM THE RAPID OBSOLESCENCE AND PLANNED 




Ann C. Hodges and Porcher L. Taylor, III* 
 
The recent rapid pace of technological change has made human capital 
more important, yet it has rendered the employee’s knowledge base obsolete more 
quickly.  Employers use covenants not to compete, restricting employees from 
switching to work for competitors, in order to retain knowledgeable personnel.  
Currently, the lack of predictability in interpreting noncompete agreements allows 
employers to draft overly-lengthy noncompetes, encourages enforcement 
litigation, and curtails employees from changing jobs because of the fear of 
litigation.  Employees should not be prevented from working for competitors for 
longer than is necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate interest.  Use of 
obsolescence as a guide in drafting noncompete agreements should provide the 
protection employers need without overburdening the employee’s option to 
change jobs.  Judges should utilize court-appointed obsolescence experts in order 
to determine the useful life of employee knowledge and should limit noncompete 
agreements accordingly.  This judicial scrutiny should encourage employers to tie 
restrictions directly to obsolescence of employee knowledge, improving both 
predictability and fairness of noncompete agreements. 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The technological revolution has had vast consequences for American employment.  As 
the economic base has changed from manufacturing to information, knowledgeable employees 
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have become increasingly valuable to employers.  The rapid pace of technological change has 
made human capital even more essential, while at the same time rendering the employees’ 
knowledge base obsolete more quickly.  As employees have become both more crucial and more 
expendable, employee mobility has increased, particularly in the information industry.  While 
job growth in the information sector has continued at a slower pace than in the 1990s, employers 
in some technology sectors are laying off substantial numbers of employees.  To retain valued 
employees in this age of change, employers frequently resort to covenants not to compete, 
restricting workers from departing to work for competitors, whether their terminations are 
voluntary or involuntary. 
Many commentators have recognized the problem of lack of predictability in interpreting 
noncompete agreements.1  When enforceability of such agreements is uncertain, drafting 
agreements is difficult, enforcement litigation is encouraged, and employees may be restrained 
from changing jobs for fear of expensive litigation.  Overreaching employers are not discouraged 
from drafting lengthy noncompetes in hopes that the “in terrorem” effect will keep employees 
from leaving with their valuable knowledge.2  Where reasonableness is the touchstone for 
enforcement, some uncertainty is guaranteed.  As courts have interpreted noncompetes over 
time, however, generalized understandings of the limits of reasonableness have emerged in 
particular industries and occupations. 
In this changing economy, employers drafting noncompetes do not appear to be taking 
sufficient account of the more rapid obsolescence of employee knowledge.  Employees cannot be 
prevented from working for competitors for longer than necessary to protect the employer’s 
legitimate interest.  In this article, we propose that trial court judges, aided by court-appointed 
expert witnesses on information and technology obsolescence, reduce the time duration clauses 
in noncompetition agreements in high-technology industries where appropriate.  Indeed, rapid 
obsolescence and planned obsolescence are unavoidable drafting issues for employers, and 
interpretation issues for trial courts, in the 21st century.  While the Internet-savvy federal trial 
court judge in the highly publicized EarthWeb case did indicate that a one-year noncompetition 
agreement in the Internet industry was "several generations, if not an eternity," the judge 
rendered that opinion without the aid of a technology obsolescence expert.3  The opinion does 
not reveal the specific basis for the judge’s conclusion about the pace of change in the Internet 
industry other than reliance on an earlier New York case in which the court similarly reduced the 
length of post-employment restriction on competition based on the rapidly changing nature of the 
industry.  While the judge’s statement might resonate anecdotally for anyone who owns a 
                                                
1  See, e.g., Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsideration of 
the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 Or. L. Rev. 1163, 1180-82 (2001); Pierre 
Bergeron, Navigating the “Deep and Unsettled Sea” of Covenant Not to Compete Litigation in Ohio: A 
Comprehensive Look, 31 U. Tol. L. Rev. 373, 373-74 (2000); Nathan Newman, Trade Secrets and Collective 
Bargaining: A Solution to Resolving Tensions in the Economics of Innovation, 6 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 1, 2, 41 
(2002); Kenneth J. Vanko, “You’re Fired! And Don’t Forget Your Non-Compete . . .”:  The Enforceability of 
Restrictive Covenants in Involuntary Discharge Cases, 1 DePaul Bus. & Com. L.J. 1, 2 (2002) (discussing the lack 
of clear guidance regarding enforcement of restrictive covenants in discharge cases).   
 
2  See Bernard Stamler, How Long is the Reach of Your Former Employer?, N.Y. Times, February 11, 2001, § 
3, at 9. 
 
3  EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
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personal computer, more precise analysis of the time value of employee knowledge will benefit 
both employers and employees. 
When interpretation of the reasonableness of time restrictions on competition involved 
primarily sales employees, judges could use their own experience and evidence from the parties 
to determine the restriction necessary to preserve customer loyalty.  In the information industry, 
however, such generalized knowledge will not aid significantly in determining the useful life of 
employee knowledge, thus rendering experts useful in deciding such cases.  If courts do decide 
to call on obsolescence experts to help them evaluate noncompetition agreements, employers 
might be motivated to draft reasonable, quantifiable obsolescence clauses into such agreements 
and employees might be more likely to abide by such restrictions. 
The article begins with a brief review of the changing nature of the employment 
relationship and follows with a discussion of the law of post-employment restrictions.  The 
article then analyzes several cases applying the law in the technology sector, which courts have 
recognized as “a nascent industry which is evolving and re-inventing itself with breathtaking 
speed.”4  Next, the article discusses the phenomena of both rapid obsolescence and planned 
obsolescence, with a particular focus on technology, recommending that judges utilize 
obsolescence to calculate more precisely the appropriate duration of noncompetes.  The article 
then reviews judicial competence to evaluate cases involving complex technology and concludes 
that the use of court-appointed experts could provide an invaluable aid in interpreting 
noncompete clauses and deciding trade secret cases.  Finally, the article recommends that 
employers draft noncompete clauses coextensive with the useful life of employee knowledge.  
Use of obsolescence as a guide provides greater enforcement predictability, which offers 
guidance for employers as drafters and employees as signers of such agreements.  Greater 
judicial scrutiny of such agreements should encourage employers to tie restrictions explicitly to 




II.  POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS IN THE TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY 
 
A.  Human Capital and Employee Mobility 
 
As the American economy has transitioned from a manufacturing-based economy to an 
information-based economy, human capital has become increasingly more important to the 
success of most business enterprises.  The value of many companies is no longer concentrated in 
their tangible assets; rather it is in the intangible assets, the knowledge, experience and creativity 
of their employees.  It is the employees, not the machinery, equipment or facilities, who provide 
the most significant competitive advantage for many businesses.5 
In the high-technology industry in particular, technical knowledge and information, along 
                                                
4  Id. at 306. 
 
5  Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes over the Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing 
Workplace, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 721, 721 (2002).  Certainly, the knowledge and creativity of employees add value in a 
manufacturing economy as well, but the relative percentage of the value is less. 
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with the ability to creatively use such knowledge, forms the basis of innovation, increasing the 
company’s ability to compete in the marketplace.  Thus, obtaining and retaining key employees 
has taken on heightened importance for high-tech companies. 
But the change in the economy in recent years has been accompanied by a change in the 
nature of the employment relationship.  In the mid-twentieth century economy, most employees 
expected to spend their entire career with one employer.6  Employers constructed internal labor 
markets and provided benefits designed to encourage lifetime employment.7  This translated to 
an implicit “psychological contract” of long-term employment reflective of the expectations of 
employers and employees.8  Drawing on the literature of human resources and organizational 
behavior, Professor Stone describes the “new psychological contract” as one with reduced 
expectations of long-term employment.9  Employees are expected to manage their own careers, 
changing jobs when necessary to develop their skills and potential; their commitment is to their 
careers, not to any employer.10 
The result of these changes is greater mobility of employees.11  This mobility is prompted 
not only by the lack of employer structures designed to promote longevity, but also by career 
advice to employees to build their knowledge, skills and experiences to make themselves more 
marketable in the ever-changing workplace.12  In high-tech industries, mobility is even more 
prevalent.13  Despite the business failures among dot-coms and the stock market free-fall in 
technology stocks, the industry has continued to add jobs, although at a slower rate than during 
the boom years of the 1990s.14  Indeed, because of the shortage of skilled workers, the 
                                                
6  See Marleen A. O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary 
Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1189, 1203-07 (1991) (explaining long-term relationships 
between employees and employers). 
 
7  Stone, supra note 5, at 725.  As Stone notes, this description of the employment relationship is most relevant 
to men employed by large corporations. Id. at 725-26. 
 
8  Id. at 728-29; O’Connor, supra note 6, at 1205-07. 
 
9  Stone, supra note 5, at 729-32.  Like the old psychological contract, the new psychological contract is not 
descriptive of all employment relationships.  Catherine L. Fisk, Reflections on the New Psychological Contract and 
the Ownership of Human Capital, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 765, 768 (2002). 
 
10  Stone, supra note 5, at 730-32. 
 
11  Id. at 727 (citing data on the decline in job tenure of employees).  
 
12  Peter Cappelli, The New Deal at Work 14, 28-29 (1999). 
 
13  William Lynch Schaller, Jumping Ship: Legal Issues Relating to Employee Mobility in High Technology 
Industries, 17 Lab. Law. 25, 25 (2001). 
 
14  Two High-Tech Studies Show Slower IT Job Growth in 2003, 172 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 6 (May 12, 2003) 
(reporting slow job growth but noting that jobs are still being added at the highest levels and few high-tech workers 
are experiencing pay cuts); Rebecca Vesely, Letter from Silicon Valley: High Employment in High Technology 
Sector, 276 The Nation 20 (May 26, 2003) (analyzing the effects of the recession on Silicon Valley); Employment in 
High-Tech Industry Shows Smallest Hike in Six Years, 170 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 141 (July 8, 2002) (reporting a one 
percent increase in the number of workers employed in high-tech companies in 2001). 
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government permits importation of workers under the H1-B visa program, which is accompanied 
by training grants designed to increase the number of skilled American workers in the 
technology field.15  This ongoing demand for workers will fuel employee mobility as companies 
compete to attract the best and brightest. 
Another explanation for the high employee turnover in the industry is the culture of 
mobility that developed in Silicon Valley.16  Professor Gilson argues that this culture was shaped 
by the “legal infrastructure” and particularly the law barring enforcement of noncompetition 
covenants in California.17  Indeed, Professor Gilson contends that the difference in 
noncompetition law explains the relatively greater success of the industry in Silicon Valley as 
compared to the Route 128 corridor in Massachusetts.18  Knowledge is transferred between firms 
by employee movement, thereby generating continuing innovation that is not limited by “the life 
cycle of any single product.”19 
While rapid employment mobility20 may benefit the industry as a whole, as Gilson 
suggests, each individual employer has an incentive to retain employees who have the 
knowledge and skill the employer needs.21  Since the changing product markets, changing skill 
requirements, and the need for flexibility discourage explicit or implicit promises of long-term 
employment, employers must find other methods of encouraging employee loyalty.22  Promises 
of training and networking opportunities that enable career-building provide one incentive for 
employees.23  Golden handcuffs,24 employee participation, and teamwork also increase 
                                                
15   In Brief, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) (Oct. 23, 2000). 
 
16  Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 
128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575, 590 (1999) (citing AnnaLee Saxenian, Regional 
Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 (1994)).   
 
17  Id. at 596-97.  Gilson notes that Professor Alan Hyde has attributed the culture of employee mobility in 
Silicon Valley to California’s weak protection of trade secrets, an alternative element of the legal infrastructure, 
although Gilson disagrees with this explanation. Id. at 610-13. 
 
18  Id. at 578.  But see Jason S. Wood, A Comparison of the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete and 
Recent Economic Histories of Four High Technology Regions, 5 Va. J.L. & Tech. 14 (2000) (suggesting, based on 
the economic growth of Silicon Valley, the Route 128 Corridor, the Research Triangle Park in North Carolina and 
Austin, Texas and analysis of law relating to noncompetition covenants in the four states, that the law is either not as 
important a factor as Gilson argues or is obscured by other factors). 
 
19  Gilson, supra note 16, at 591 (citing Saxenian, supra note 16). 
 
20  Id. (citing Alan Hyde, Real Human Capital: The Economics and Law of Shared Knowledge (May 1998) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York University Law Review)). 
 
21  Id. at 595. 
 
22  Stone, supra note 5, at 733; Charles Heckscher, Living with Flexibility, Rekindling the Movement: Labor’s 
Quest for Relevance in the Twenty-First Century 59, 65 (Lowell Turner, et al. eds., 2001); Cappelli, supra note 12, 
at 43-48, 215-20. 
 
23  Stone, supra note 5, at 735-36. 
 
24  Golden handcuffs tie pay and benefits to retention, but do not always work effectively.  Cappelli, supra note 
12, at 185-87. 
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commitment.25  In addition, employers are increasingly turning to legal restrictions to prevent 
employees from taking their knowledge and skills to a competitive employer.26 
 
 
B.  The Role of Post-Employment Restrictions 
 
1.  The Law of Post-Employment Restrictions 
 
The law of post-employment restrictions is a hybrid of contract and intellectual property 
law.27  The disputes that arise when an employee leaves one employer for another28 are about 
ownership and control of human capital.  Much of the litigation relates to preliminary injunctive 
relief, as the former employer seeks to prevent the employee from working for the new 
employer, arguing that irreparable harm would result if the employee were permitted to violate 
noncompetition or nondisclosure agreements or to disclose trade secrets to the new employer.  
As a legal matter, the dispute might arise in one of several ways, under statutory or common law.  
As a statutory matter,29 the employer might claim that the employee misappropriated a trade 
secret, which is secret information that grants the possessor a competitive advantage.30  Most 
trade secret cases involve technological trade secrets,31 making the claim particularly relevant in 
the high-tech industry.  Although the law varies somewhat by state, a trade secret claim generally 
requires the employer to show that the employee “acquired, used or disclosed the [trade secret] in 
breach of confidence or by other improper means.”32  Trade secret law seeks to enable businesses 
to protect their “investments in research and development” without unduly restraining employee 
mobility and competition.33 
Alternatively, common law claims exist to enforce agreements between the employee and 
                                                
25  Id. at 218-20.  Cappelli notes that employee autonomy and the organizational structure of work also affect 
commitment.  Id. at 218-19. 
 
26  Stone, supra note 5, at 738-39 (showing increasing litigation over post-employment restrictions in recent 
years); Arnow-Richman, supra note 1, at 1165. 
 
27  Fisk, supra note 9, at 771-72; Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of 
Justification, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 241, 244 (1998); Newman, supra note 1, at 7-9; Steven Wilf, Trade Secrets, Property 
and Social Relations, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 787, 790 (2002). 
 
28  Or to begin his or her own entrepreneurial organization. 
 
29  Although trade secret law began as common law, it is now codified by most states, spurred by the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act.  Bone, supra note 27, at 247. 
 
30  Id. at 248; Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 (1995). 
 
31  Bone, supra note 27, at 248. 
 
32  Id. at 247. 
 
33  Danielle Pasqualone, Intellectual Property: Globespan v. O’Neill, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 251, 252 (2002). 
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the employer.34  The agreements might take the form of a confidentiality agreement in which the 
employee agreed not to disclose particular information, generally trade secrets, or a covenant not 
to compete in which the employee agreed not to compete with the employer.  Another potential 
common law claim is breach of the duty of loyalty implied in the employment relationship. 
While a covenant not to disclose confidential information provides a contractual basis for 
enforcement of trade secret law, covenants not to compete impose broader restrictions on 
employees.  Despite their contractual basis, courts have been historically reluctant to enforce 
such covenants for policy reasons.  Noncompetition covenants restrain trade and prevent 
employees from using their skills to earn a living.35  In addition, society is deprived of the 
services of the employee.36   At the same time, courts have recognized that employers have an 
interest in preventing employees from using the employer’s trade secrets, training, customers, 
and good will to assist the competition.37  Inability to prevent such losses would discourage 
employers from investing in research, development and training.  To accommodate these 
interests, the courts have developed a standard of reasonableness which governs the enforcement 
of covenants not to compete.  A covenant will be enforced if the employer can establish a 
defendable interest that is within the knowledge of the employee and if the covenant is 
reasonable in duration, geographic limitation and scope of employment prohibited.38  Like the 
law of trade secrets, the limited enforceability of noncompetition covenants is designed to strike 
a balance between the interests of the employers and the interests of employees. 
Although some states deny enforcement of noncompetition agreements except when 
connected to the sale of a business or dissolution of a partnership,39 most states will enforce 
reasonable restrictions on future employment.  In assessing the reasonableness of restrictions, the 
courts look to see whether the restraint is limited to what is necessary to protect a legitimate 
business interest of the employer.40  The courts also consider whether the covenant unduly 
                                                
34  Some states have statutes addressing the enforceability of post-employment restrictions.  John Dwight 
Ingram, Covenants Not to Compete, 36 Akron L. Rev. 49, 65-66 (2002).  These statutes vary, with some specifying 
that reasonable restraints are enforceable, some denying enforceability, and others allowing enforcement with 
particular limitations.  Id. (citing, inter alia, Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.774a(1) (2001) (permitting enforcement of 
reasonable restrictions); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600 (West 2001) (stating contracts restraining individuals from 
engaging in lawful professions and trades are void, with limited exceptions); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23.921C (West 
2001) (stating that employees can agree to covenants that restrict competition for up to two years from termination)). 
 
35  Arnow-Richman, supra note 1, at 1171.  Where there is an imbalance of bargaining power between 
employers and employees, the court should be particularly cautious about enforcing such an agreement.  Id. at 1173-
74. 
 
36  Id. at 1171. 
 
37  Id. at 1176. 
 
38  Roger M. Milgrim, Milgrim on Trade Secrets § 4.02[1][d][v] (2003); Ingram, supra note 34, at 50, 65-76.  
As noted previously, however, some states bar enforcement of such covenants.  See supra note 34. 
 
39  See, e.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 9-08-06 (2003); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16600-16602 (West 2004); Mont. 
Code. Ann. §§ 28-2-703, 704, 705 (2003). 
 
40  Ingram, supra note 34, at 67. 
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restricts the employee’s ability to earn a living, and finally, whether the enforcement of the 
agreement’s restrictions would be reasonable from a public policy perspective.41  These three 
factors are applied with respect to each of the aspects of restraint - the geographic scope, the 
length of time and the scope of the activity restriction.  In determining reasonableness of the time 
restriction, courts will typically focus on the length of time needed to protect the employer’s 
legitimate interests.42  Also, if the restriction makes it extremely difficult or impossible for the 
employee to work in the field for which he or she is qualified, it will typically be invalidated 
unless the employee is compensated for the time of unemployment.43  The public interest in 
making a wide range of services and products available in the marketplace is the final factor and 
a lengthy deprivation will typically be found unreasonable.44  The touchstone is reasonableness 
and because the facts vary by industry, occupation, and even employer, cases reflect a wide 
range of restrictions that have been upheld, while restrictions of the same or similar length have 
been struck down in other cases.45 
In some states, the courts will modify an unreasonable noncompete agreement to make it 
enforceable, while in others, any unreasonableness requires denial of enforcement.46  Some 
courts utilize the “blue pencil rule” to determine whether a covenant is partially enforceable.47  
The rule permits reformation or deletion of an invalid covenant provision if the contract terms 
are “easily divisible.”48  If the unreasonable provision is not separable, then the entire agreement 
is unenforceable.49  However, other courts will revise unreasonable agreements even where the 
                                                
41  Id. 
 
42  Id. at 69-70. 
 
43  Id. at 70-71.  Even temporary compensation may be insufficient to validate a restriction if it is likely to affect 
the employee’s continued ability to work in the field. 
 
44  Id. at 71. 
 
45  See, e.g., Bailey v. King, 398 S.W.2d 906, 908 (Ark. 1966) (upholding a one-year noncompetition covenant); 
Agrimerica, Inc. v. Mathes, 557 N.E.2d 357, 363-66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (upholding a two-year noncompetition 
covenant); Weber v. Tillman, 913 P.2d 84, 96 (Kan. 1996) (finding a two-year noncompetition covenant reasonable); 
RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 177 F. Supp. 2d 859, 878 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (upholding a three-year noncompetition covenant as 
reasonable); Kramer v. Robec, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 508, 512-13 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (enforcing only two years of a three-
year noncompete agreement); McQuown v. Lakeland Window Cleaning Co., 136 So. 2d 370, 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1962) (declining to enforce a five-year noncompetition agreement but enjoining competition for a year); 
Bergeron, supra note 1, at 378 (citing Ohio cases upholding restrictions of three and four years and others refusing 
to enforce two-year restrictions). 
 
46  See Melvin F. Jager, Trade Secrets Law § 13:8 (2003) and cases cited therein; Ingram, supra note 34, at 74-
78. 
 
47  Jager, supra note 46, at 13-53.  States following the blue pencil rule include North Carolina, Connecticut, 
Maryland, Massachusetts and Rhode Island.  Id.  At least twenty-nine states follow the blue pencil rule.  R. Mark 
Dare, Judges Should Have Power to “Blue-Pencil” Noncompetes, 18 Va. Law. Wkly. 427, Sept. 29, 2003 at B-3. 
 
48  Jager, supra note 46, at 13-53 to 13-54. 
 
49  Id. at 13-54. 
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unreasonable provisions are not severable, rejecting strict application of the blue pencil rule.50 
Like the law of noncompetition agreements, a duty of loyalty arises from common law 
and requires the employee to refrain from competing with the employer during employment.51  
The duty of loyalty applies only during employment but where an employee leaves to establish a 
competing business that was planned while the employee remained employed, duty of loyalty 
claims may accompany suits to enforce noncompetition or confidentiality agreements or to 
restrain the use of trade secrets.  While the duty of loyalty does not preclude an employee from 
preparing to move into a competing business while still employed, the employee cannot lawfully 
use the employer’s resources or confidential information to establish a competing business or 
take other actions inconsistent with faithful employment.52 
 
 
2.  Application of the Law in the High-Tech Industry 
 
The most publicized application of post-employment restriction law in the high-tech 
industry is the case of EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack.53  Mark Schlack was a vice president of 
EarthWeb, a company which provided online products and services for information technology 
(IT) professionals, including content which it obtained primarily through licensing agreements 
and acquisitions from third parties.54  After less than a year of employment, Schlack, who was in 
charge of the company’s web site content, resigned to accept a position with ITworld.com, a 
subsidiary of the largest producer of print-based information for information technology 
professionals.  A new company, ITworld.com planned to provide a website for IT professionals 
containing information authored primarily by an internal staff.  EarthWeb sought an injunction to 
prevent Schlack from employment with ITworld.com, alleging misappropriation of trade secrets 
and violation of covenants not to compete and not to disclose confidential information.  
EarthWeb feared disclosure of “(1) strategic content planning; (2) licensing agreements and 
acquisitions; (3) advertising; and (4) technical knowledge.”55 
The district court denied the injunction on several grounds.  First, the court found no 
misappropriation of trade secrets and refused to apply the doctrine of inevitable disclosure of 
trade secrets.  The doctrine holds that even in the absence of any misappropriation, where an 
employee accepts a position with a competitor so like the prior position that disclosure of 
valuable trade secrets would be essential to serve in the new position, injunctive relief is 
                                                
50  Id. at 13-55 to 13-57. 
 
51  See, e.g., Mercer Mgmt. Consulting, Inc. v. Wilde, 920 F. Supp. 219, 233 (D.D.C. 1996). 
 
52  Mercer Mgmt., 920 F. Supp. at 233; DoubleClick, Inc. v. Henderson, No. 116914/97, 1997 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 
577, at *17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 5, 1997). 
 
53  71 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d, No. 99-9302, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 11446 (2d Cir. May 18, 
2000) (unpublished). 
 
54  All facts are taken from the decision of the district court.  Id.. 
 
55  Id. at 303. 
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warranted.56  The court found that the actual noncompete agreement was narrow, limiting 
competition only in three categories of employment related to the online provision of third party 
resources.57  The court refused to use the doctrine of inevitable disclosure to expand the scope of 
the parties’ agreement, noting that retroactive alteration of a noncompete agreement would upset 
the balance that courts have sought to achieve in interpreting such agreements.58  Essentially, the 
court refused to give EarthWeb more than it bargained for, particularly where the agreement 
gave Schlack little in return as an at-will employee with no provision for severance pay, and the 
agreement could be modified unilaterally by the employer subject only to “notice and 
acknowledgment by the [e]mployee.”59 
After rejecting the inevitable disclosure argument, the court went on to consider the 
enforceability of the noncompetition covenant.  The court concluded that there was no evidence 
that Schlack’s employment with ITworld.com would violate the narrow restrictive covenant, as 
the company did not intend to use third party products or provide any directory or reference 
library for such products as its primary business.60  Further, and more important for purposes of 
the construction of future covenants in the high-tech industry, the court stated that the one-year 
duration of the covenant was unreasonably long.61  In support of this conclusion, the court cited 
“the dynamic nature of th[e] industry, [the covenant’s] lack of geographical borders, and 
Schlack’s former cutting edge position with EarthWeb where his success depended on keeping 
abreast of daily changes in content on the Internet.”62  In addition, the court relied on the prior 
decision of the Supreme Court of New York County in DoubleClick Inc. v. Henderson, which 
had enjoined defendants in the Internet advertising industry for only six months because the 
speed of change in the industry would cause the defendants’ knowledge to lose value in far less 
than a year.63 
Finally, addressing the trade secret claim, the court found that Schlack had little or no 
                                                
56  Id. at 310.  The lead case repeatedly cited by courts considering the inevitable disclosure doctrine is PepsiCo 
v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 
57  EarthWeb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 311. 
 
58  Id. 
 
59  Id. 
 
60  Id. at 312. 
 
61  Id. at 313.  Prior to EarthWeb, it was not unusual for employers to utilize noncompetition covenants of three 
to five years.  Jack E. Karns & Roger P. McIntyre, Are Intellectual Property Rights Protected in Employment 
Contract Covenants Not to Compete Given the Rapid Rate of New Product Development?, 26 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 
631, 648 n.113 (2001). 
 
62  EarthWeb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 313. 
 
63  No. 116914/97, 1997 WL 731413, at *8 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Nov. 7, 1997).  Plaintiff in DoubleClick sought a one 
year injunction based on actual and threatened misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair competition, and breach of 
employees’ duty of loyalty.  Id. at *1.  In EarthWeb, however, the court declined to rewrite the covenant to make it 
enforceable because of the other flaws in the agreement.  71 F. Supp. 2d at 313. 
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knowledge of any trade secrets.64  To the extent that he had such knowledge, the court found no 
imminent or inevitable risk of disclosure that would warrant preliminary injunctive relief.65  
Having found insufficient risk of trade secret disclosure, the court reached a similar conclusion 
with respect to risk of violation of the nondisclosure agreement.66  At the conclusion of its 
opinion, the court opined that even if the provisions of the noncompetition covenant were 
reasonable, a balancing of the hardships would require denying injunctive relief because “[w]hen 
measured against the IT industry in the Internet environment, a one-year hiatus from the 
workforce is several generations, if not an eternity.”67  Thus, the adverse effect on Schlack from 
enforcing the covenant would outweigh any harm to EarthWeb from denial of enforcement. 
Accordingly, preliminary relief was denied.68 
As various commentators have noted, EarthWeb suggests great care in drafting a 
covenant not to compete to insure its enforceability.69  In particular, the rapid change in the 
industry will affect the description of the scope of activities considered competitive and the 
duration of the covenant that is considered reasonable.70  On the other hand, the Internet may 
give employers a wider geographic scope for enforcement, for unlike the traditional cases 
involving sales territory, an employer with a presence on the Internet may have interests in 
restricting competition worldwide.71  Given the courts’ reluctance to take away an employee’s 
livelihood, however, the court may balance broader geographic scope with narrower scope for 
activity restrictions, duration or both. 
                                                
64  EarthWeb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 314-16. 
 
65  Id. at 316. 
 
66  Id. at 316-17. 
 
67  Id. at 316. 
 
68  On appeal, the Second Circuit found no error with respect to the decision on the noncompetition agreement 
but remanded for more explanation of the court’s denial of relief on the trade secret and nondisclosure agreement 
claims.  EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, No.99-9302, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1254, at *4-6 (2d Cir. Jan. 31, 2000) 
(unpublished).  On remand, the district court reaffirmed its finding that there was no imminent risk of disclosure that 
would establish irreparable injury and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, No. 99-9302, 2000 
U.S. App. LEXIS 11446, at *3-7 (2d Cir. May 18, 2000) (unpublished). 
 
69  See, e.g., Karns & McIntyre, supra note 61, at 647; Dan Messeloff, Note, Giving the Green Light to Silicon 
Alley Employees: No-Compete Agreements Between Internet Companies and Employees Under New York Law, 11 
Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 711, 741 (2001); Douglas M. Towns, Employment “Non-Compete 
Agreements” in the Internet Revolution, GigaLaw.com, at http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2000-all/towns-2000-
08-all.html (August 2000). 
 
70  See, e.g., Colonize.com Inc. v. Perlow, No. 03-CV-466, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20021, at *17 (N.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 23, 2003) (suggesting without deciding the issue that a “one year restriction could be excessive given the 
dynamic nature of today's online marketing industry”). 
 
71  National Bus. Servs. v. Wright, 2 F. Supp. 2d 701, 708 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (upholding national geographic 
restriction on competition because “[t]ransactions involving the Internet, unlike traditional ‘sales territory’ cases, are 
not limited by state boundaries”); Stone, supra note 5, at 741 (citing Ackerman v. Kimball Int’l, Inc., 652 N.E.2d 
507, 510 (Ind. 1995)).  
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While EarthWeb is the most notorious case involving the reasonable scope of a covenant 
not to compete in the high-tech industry, it is by no means the only such case.  Much earlier, a 
Pennsylvania court reduced a nationwide restrictive covenant for a project manager designing 
computer networks from three years to two years, based on the “quick pace of obsolescence and 
technological innovation.”72  In a Kansas case, Sprint Corporation was unable to obtain 
injunctive relief because the noncompetition covenant’s scope was ambiguous, in part as a result 
of “the explosion of technology” in the Internet industry.73  The burden of proof was on the 
plaintiff company and under Kansas law, covenants not to compete are strictly construed against 
the employer.74  Because of the explosive development of Internet technology, the relationship 
between the Internet and long distance services was different at the time of the court hearing than 
at the time the agreement was entered into three years earlier, and would continue to evolve with 
technology.75  The resulting ambiguity of the agreement, which prohibited plaintiff from working 
in a business “related to” long distance services, prevented the employer from showing that 
DeAngelo must be barred from working for a company developing Internet services.76  And, of 
course, in the DoubleClick decision relied on in EarthWeb, the Supreme Court of New York 
County barred employees from opening a competing business for only six months because of the 
rapid changes in the Internet advertising industry, even though the court found that the plaintiff 
employer was likely to succeed on claims of misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of the duty 
of loyalty and unfair competition.77 
Not all courts have rejected enforcement or modified noncompetition covenants in the 
technology-related industries, however.  In National Business Services v. Wright, the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania enforced a nationwide, one year 
competition bar against an employee involved in Internet sales in the advertising specialty 
industry.78  While recognizing that one year was a long time in the industry, the court issued an 
injunction based on the covenant because the employee’s new job would involve direct 
                                                
72  Kramer v. Robec, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 508, 512 (E.D. Pa. 1992). 
 
73  Sprint Corp. v. DeAngelo, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1194 (D. Kan. 1998). 
 
74  Id. at 1192-93. 
 
75  Id. at 1193. 
 
76  Id. at 1193-94. 
 
77  DoubleClick, Inc. v. Henderson, No. 116914/97, 1997 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 577 at *17, *19-20, *22 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Nov. 5, 1997).  In another case in the high technology industry, arising in a different context, the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York found a noncompetition clause unenforceable where the geographic 
scope and duration were unlimited, and the scope of restricted activity was extraordinarily broad and subject to the 
judgment of the company CEO.  Lucente v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 117 F. Supp. 2d 336, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), 
rev'd by 310 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 2002).  The alleged breach of the noncompetition covenant triggered loss of restricted 
stock and stock options by an employee who had involuntarily retired from the company.  Id. at 344, 350.  The 
Second Circuit reversed and remanded, however, not reaching the issue of the enforceability of the covenant 
because it found that summary judgment was improperly granted on the issue of whether Lucente quit or was 
involuntarily terminated. Lucente, 310 F.3d at 243. 
 
78  National Bus. Servs. v. Wright, 2 F. Supp. 2d 701 (E.D. Pa. 1998). 
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competition with her former employer, which had established her access to confidential 
information about technical and marketing plans and her extensive contacts with customers, as 
well as her industry reputation as an expert on Internet products.79  While the case involved 
Internet sales and thus a rapidly changing industry, it is in many ways more like the traditional 
noncompetition cases involving sales and concerns about loss of customers, rather than technical 
knowledge. 
With the rapidly changing nature of many industries and the growing use of technology 
in all areas of the economy, the tendency of judges to scrutinize carefully the length of 
noncompetition agreements and shorten them where appropriate based on changing technology 
and markets may move beyond the high-tech industry.80  In states where courts cannot rewrite 




III.   OBSOLESCENCE SUBSTANTIALLY SHORTENS THE USEFUL LIFE OF EMPLOYEE KNOWLEDGE 
 
A.  Obsolescence is a Consequence of Rapidly Evolving Technology 
 
EarthWeb and similar cases may presage an era where judges declare certain employee 
knowledge obsolete in determining whether to enforce noncompete and confidentiality 
agreements in the high-tech industry.  The issue arises primarily in cases where employers seek 
to enjoin employees from working for competitors, either based on an agreement not to compete 
or not to disclose confidential information or an argument that the employment will require 
inevitable disclosure of trade secrets.  Judges may recognize the shortened shelf life of trade 
secrets and other employee knowledge due to rapid obsolescence of technology and downsize 
the time span of noncompetes to correspond to the substantial devaluation of the information.  
Obsolescence renders an employer’s legitimate business need for protection from competition by 
former employees less compelling.82  Foreseeably, noncompete agreements could be reduced so 
                                                
79  Id. at 708-09. 
 
80  As noted previously, rapidly changing technology may also affect the interpretation of noncompetition 
agreements in other ways.  The scope of permissible restrictions may change as technology affects the relevance of 
employees’ knowledge.  See supra text at note 70.  Also, wider geographical restrictions may be reasonable as more 
businesses use the Internet to expand their sales and services nationally and even internationally. See supra text 
accompanying note 71.  These changes are also important outside the high-tech arena.  Furthermore, as the area of 
potential competition has grown, former employees are increasingly able to compete from other states.  Mark R. 
Cheskin & Brian L. Lerner, New Concerns for Traditional Noncompetes, Nat’l L.J., November 3, 2003, at 17.  
Because noncompetition law is state law, questions about enforcement of agreements arise, including which state’s 
law applies and whether a state can enforce an agreement outside its borders.  Id.  See, e.g., Application Group, Inc. 
v. Hunter Group, Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the trial court correctly applied 
California law and declined to enforce noncompete agreement of employee in Maryland, despite contrary choice of 
law provision in agreement, because of California’s greater interest in application of its law barring enforcement of 
such agreements). 
 
81  See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 
82  As early as 1992, an American court reduced a nationwide covenant not to compete from three years to two 
years “because of the quick pace of obsolescence and technological innovation.”  Kramer v. Robec, Inc., 824 F. 
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significantly that they may become virtually extinct in some high-tech sub-industries.  In others, 
noncompetes may be limited in time based on the industry product cycles.  The silicon chip 
industry would be a likely venue for the limitation of high-tech noncompetes because of the 
theorem known as Moore’s Law. 
 
 
1.  Moore’s Law and Noncompetes 
 
In 1965, Gordon Moore, the co-founder of Intel, theorized in an article in Electronics 
Magazine that the computing power and complexity of a silicon chip would double every year.83  
This exponential rate remained constant until 1975.  In 1975, the year he became CEO of Intel, 
Moore revised his prediction to doubling every two years.84  This “law” remains valid today, 
with the widely accepted understanding that computing power doubles on average “every 
eighteen months at the same price point.”85  Moore’s industry axiom has “ruled unabated”86 for 
at least 37 years (1965-2002), and industry predictions indicate that it may continue to do so until 
at least 2017 “before microchips shrink to their physical limit.”87 
No one can truly appreciate or comprehend the dizzying speed of technological change 
codified in Moore’s Law, and its impact on consumer electronic consumption, without pondering 
four prior pioneering technological cycles in America: the telephone, the television, the personal 
computer and the household linkage to the Internet.  “It took forty years for 30% of Americans to 
own a telephone, seventeen years for 30% of Americans to own a television, thirteen years for 
30% of Americans to own a personal computer, and only seven years for 30% of Americans to 
come online on the Internet.”88 
Although no judge appears to have considered Moore’s law in this context, given its 
                                                
Supp. 508, 512 (E.D. Pa. 1992). 
 
83  See generally Matt Richtel, Five Questions for Gordon E. Moore: Technology Intensifies the Law of Change, 
N.Y. Times, May 27, 2001, § 3 (Money & Business), at 4; Dori J. Yang, The Lawgiver: Gordon Moore Is Still 
Chipping Away, U.S. News & World Rep., July 10, 2000, at 38 (attributing to Gordon Moore the development of a 
law describing the exponential growth of silicon chip processing power).  In the years following Moore’s prediction, 
not only did computing capacity double but prices of chips decreased.  John Markoff, Intel Reports A Research Leap 
To a Faster Chip, N.Y. Times, Feb.12, 2004, at C1. 
 
84  Yang, supra note 83; David Friedman, Does Technology Require New Law?, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 71, 
81 n.29 (2001). 
 
85  Dhruv Khanna & Bruce M. Aitken, The Public's Need for More Affordable Bandwidth: The Case for 
Immediate Regulatory Action, 75 Or. L. Rev. 347, 348 (1996).  Computers with the same computing power will 
drop in price.  Id. at n.7.  The doubling of computing power every eighteen months is the average over the years.  
Yang, supra note 83. 
 
86  John Markoff, Is Planned Obsolescence Obsolete?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 2002, § 4 (Week in Review), at 6. 
 
87  Id. 
 
88  Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to High Technology Competition, 44 Wm. & Mary 
L. Rev. 65, 75 (2002) (citing Daniel J. Meckstroth, Manufacturers’ Alliance/MAPI, How New B2B E-Business 
Strategies Are Changing Manufacturing, Jan. 2001, at 2). 
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ubiquitous validation in the semi-conductor realm,89  judges may find it useful to give judicial 
notice to Moore’s law in noncompete cases.  Presumably, the catalyst for this recognition will be 
aggressive and savvy employees’ counsel who will invoke Moore’s Law as a rallying cry for 
courts to perform pen and ink surgery on the temporal component of noncompetes.  It is 
axiomatic that the length of a time restriction contained in a noncompete agreement must be no 
longer than is necessary to protect the interests of an employer.90  Since Moore’s Law virtually 
quantifies the rate of obsolescence in the microchip industry, an employer-induced noncompete 
of three years, for example, would be ripe for judicial downsizing because three years would be 
tantamount to an employer’s affront to Moore’s Law.  A techno-savvy and prudent judge might 
find that a noncompete that did not comport with the semi-conductor industry’s own venerable 
“law” on the rapid obsolescence rate of silicon technology was unnecessary to protect the 
employer’s legitimate interest.  Moore’s Law, at its very heart, is a “law” of product 
obsolescence.91 
Judges should use Moore’s Law as a barometer of a noncompete’s temporal 
reasonableness.  If this concept gained precedential value, perhaps operating as a presumption 
subject to rebuttal in particular cases where the employee’s specific knowledge made a longer or 
shorter agreement more reasonable, then semi-conductor companies would have a bright line of 
reasonableness when drafting the time dimension of an employee noncompete agreement.  The 
time durability of a trade secret or other employee knowledge would no longer be a discretionary 
determination by employers, subject only to the departing employee’s expensive litigation.  
Given the widespread acceptance of Moore’s Law in the industry, it is likely that a judge could 
take judicial notice of the duration of the semi-conductor product cycle, either on his or her own 
initiative or at the urging of counsel.92  Creation of a bright line test of temporal reasonableness 
based on Moore’s Law would probably reduce the likelihood that litigation over the agreement 
would even ensue, creating litigation cost-savings for employers.  A major adversarial 
component in employer-employee relations in drafting noncompete agreements would be taken 
out of the potential litigation equation.  This would be a 360 degree win for everyone at the “new 
psychological contract” table. 
The impact of Moore’s Law is not limited to the semiconductor industry.93  The increase 
                                                
89  Markoff, supra note 86. 
 
90  Liautaud v. Liautaud, 221 F.3d 981, 988 (7th Cir. 2000); Kramer v. Robec, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 508, 512 (E.D. 
Pa. 1992).  
 
91  John Markoff, Is There Life after Silicon Valley’s Fast Lane?  Pace of Innovation May Need Reining In, 
N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 2003, at C1. 
 
92  See McCormick on Evidence § 330 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 5th ed. 1999) (noting that principles that are 
accepted as valid in the relevant scientific community as evidenced by reliable sources are subject to judicial notice, 
and suggesting that counsel should bring such sources to the judge’s attention as judges will vary in their willingness 
to seek out such sources).  Product life cycles in other industries which have not become accepted as axioms by the 
scientific community would require evidence as to their duration but could still function as guides for the court in 
determining the durability of noncompetition agreements and trade secrets for purposes of disclosure litigation.  See 
id. 
 
93  Technological developments by Intel suggest that Moore’s Law may become applicable in fiber optic arena 
also.  See Markoff, supra note 83, at C1.  Intel “hopes to transform the world of data networking by placing it on the 
manufacturing cost curve know as Moore’s Law.” Id. 
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in computing power affects many other industries dependent on processor speed and creates the 
same rapid obsolescence effect.  “Moore’s Law and analogous concepts related to advances in 
processor speed, data compression, and networking can reasonably be expected to continue to 
reduce the cost and expand the capability of consumer technology for storing, replicating, and 
distributing content for the foreseeable future.”94  Consumer technology such as personal video 
recorders and MP3 players will be affected by Moore’s Law.95  Both the communications 
industry and the software industry rely on Moore’s Law as new product development follows the 
Moore’s Law curve, building on faster computing power and reductions in price.96  Indeed, 
Professor Jeffrey Mackie-Mason from the University of Michigan, who specializes in the 
economics of information technology,97 suggests that companies whose business involves 
information technology must follow Moore’s Law: 
 
 If you're in a business where your core value is information technology, if 
you're in some sense an information technology business, and the argument is 
essentially that everything is going to become to some extent an information 
technology business, but if that's really what your value is coming from, where 
your product and your value to your customers is coming from, then you have to 
be on the Moore's Law curve.  Because if you're not, one of your competitors will 
be.  You have to be bringing out new products, improving your products or 
reducing your costs at that same exponential rate as Moore's Law or if not you'll 
be left behind.98 
 
Accordingly, Moore’s Law can provide a guide to the appropriate length of noncompetes 
in a wide variety of industries.  The significance of the role of Moore’s Law in these industries 
suggests that, at a minimum, it should be the presumptive outside limit of the duration of a 
noncompete, with both parties having the opportunity to overcome the presumption by showing 
that a different rule should apply under the particular circumstances.  Given the pace of change, 
in most cases the specific evidence would likely reduce the appropriate length of the noncompete 
as businesses try to exceed Moore’s Law with developing products.  Use of Moore’s Law by 
courts will encourage businesses to utilize Moore’s Law as a drafting guide and provide more 
predictability for both employers and employees in determining the enforceability of 
noncompetes.  In an area of law where uncertainty prevails, this bright line test, even when 
operating as a presumption subject to rebuttal, will aid the courts and the parties 
                                                
94  Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 63, 177 (2002). 
 
95  Id. at 177-78. 
 
96  Jim Davidson, Comment Before Law, Policy, and the Convergence of Telecommunication and Computing 
Technologies Conference, in 2001 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 1, 118 (2001); Jeffrey Mackie-Mason, 
Comment Before Law, Policy, and the Convergence of Telecommunications and Computing Technologies 
Conference, in 2001 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 1, 118, 127 (2001). 
 
97  Jeffrey S. Lehman, Comment Before Law, Policy, and the Convergence of Telecommunications and 
Computing Technologies Conference, in 2001 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 1, 113 (2001) 
 
98  Mackie-Mason, supra note 96, at 126. 
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2.  The Effect of Nanotechnology 
 
Notwithstanding the promise that Moore’s Law might hold for reducing litigation in the 
arena of noncompetition agreements, the rapid progress of nanotechnology might require some 
fine-tuning of Moore’s Law as the size of silicon chips approaches the molecular level.99  Indeed, 
machines and devices the size of molecules may be ushering in the next Industrial Revolution.100 
“Nanotech takes its name from the nanometer, a unit of measurement just one billionth of 
a meter long.”101  The applied science of nanotechnology, “building things from the bottom up -- 
one atom or molecule at a time,”102 is having a significant impact well beyond the semi-
conductor industry.  It is updating production methods in the health care, computer, chemical and 
aerospace industries, by spawning superior new products.103  Not only is the silicon computer 
chip in danger of extinction in this Lilliputian world of nanotechnology, but factories themselves 
may be thrown onto the outdated technology heap.  Some experts foresee factories built “at the 
molecular level able to churn out virtually any product desired from materials ubiquitous in the 
atmosphere, like dirt and water.”104 
Presidential science advisers envisage a nanotech world of “[m]aterials with ten times the 
strength of steel and only a small fraction of the weight,” and all of the information at the Library 
of Congress contained in “a device the size of a sugar cube.”105  That vision is not so far-fetched, 
given the National Science Foundation’s generous funding of the Nanotechnology Initiative and 
the predicted growth of the nanotechnology market.106  Similarly, huge investments by business 
and academia in nanotechnology research reflect that this innovation road may not be paved with 
yellow bricks.  “UCLA and Hewlett-Packard have laid the ground work for the world’s first 
                                                
99  See Apply Here, Small Wonders: A Survey of Nanotechnology, The Economist, January 1, 2005 at 6, 8.  
Indeed, some suggest that chip manufacturers are “already in the realm of nanotechnology.”  Id. 
 
100  Phillip J. Longman, The Next Big Thing Is Small: Machines the Size of Molecules Are Creating the Next 
Industrial Revolution, U. S. News & World Rep., July 3, 2000, at 30; David P.Hamilton, The Nanotechnician: How 
small can computer chips get? According to Charles Lieber, a few atoms are all you need, Wall St. J., May 13, 
2002, at R17. 
 
101  Longman, supra note 100, at 31. 
 
102  Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Nanotechnology and Regulatory Policy: Three Futures, 17 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 179, 
181 (2003). 
 
103  Longman, supra note 100, at 30. 
 
104  Timothy Aeppel, Think Small: Imagine changing a chair into a table at the flick of a switch; Welcome to 
nanotechnology, Wall St. J., Dec. 31, 1999, at R40. 
 
105  Longman, supra note 100, at 31 (quoting President Clinton at a speech at Caltech in January 2000). 
 
106  Bruce Schechter, They’ve Seen the Future and Intend to Live It, N.Y. Times, July 16, 2002, at F4 (noting 
that the National Science Foundation’s National Nanotechnology Initiative spent more than $600 million in 2001 on 
studying the basic science of nano-matter); see also Eric Roston, Very Small Business, Time, Sept. 23, 2002 at A13 
(Global Business Supplement) (noting that “[t]he National Science Foundation foresees a $1 trillion market by 2015 
for nano products”). 
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molecular computer”.107  Such a miniaturized computer would be enormously faster, 
“exponentially more powerful” and “dirt cheap” in cost compared to today’s computers.108  
Nano-engineers might be able “to make computers as easily as photographic film.”109 
Nanotechnology, or molecular electronics, may alter the entire semi-conductor industry, 
possibly within the next decade.110  The realization of nanotechnology, which is proceeding at a 
rapid pace,111 could have a significant impact on the construction of noncompete agreements.  
Nanotechnology might require a revised temporal “law” of product obsolescence because a 
whole generation of trade secrets might be shelved in several industries.112 
 
 
B.  Planned Obsolescence Devalues Trade Secrets and Employee Knowledge 
 
Something much more immediate on the radar screen than nanotechnology, planned 
obsolescence, affects the time duration of post-employment restrictions.  Commentators and 
even courts have recognized the significance of planned obsolescence in American society.113  
                                                
107  Longman, supra note 100, at 33. 
 
108  Markoff, supra note 91, at C1. 
 
109  Id., quoting UCLA chemistry professor James R. Heath. 
 
110  John Markoff, Computer Scientists Are Poised for Revolution on a Tiny Scale, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1999, at 
C1. 
 
111  For discussions of the effect of nanotechnology on the law, see Reynolds, supra note 102, at 180 (overview 
of nanotechnology and regulatory responses); Frederick A. Fiedler & Glenn H. Reynolds, Legal Problems of 
Nanotechnology: An Overview, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 593, 619 (1994) (predicting that intellectual property in 
software and designs will become far more valuable, enhancing legal protections against counterfeiting); The 
Honorable Arthur J. Gajarsa, The Fifth Annual Honorable Helen Wilson Nies Memorial Lecture in Intellectual 
Property Law: Quo Vadis?, 6 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 1, 8-9 (2002) (discussing the impact of nanotechnology on 
the law of intellectual property). 
 
112  Unlike cases involving Moore’s Law, judges could not use judicial notice to establish the temporal 
dimension of noncompetes if nanotechnology alters Moore’s Law.  Instead, evidence of impending product 
obsolescence would be required, at least until a new axiom similar to Moore’s Law developed.  See McCormick on 
Evidence § 330 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 5th ed. 1999) (suggesting that judicial notice has limited utility in the 
current technological era where scientific truths change quickly). 
 
113  See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Fleetwood Dental, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 664, 665 (C.D. Cal. 1980) 
(recognizing the societal prevalence of planned obsolescence in a patent and trademark infringement case); Vincent 
R. Johnson, Liberating Progress and the Free Market from the Specter of Tort Liability, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1026, 
1035-36 n.65 (1989) (book review) (quoting R. Rodes, Law and Liberation 66 (1986): “[N]ot only do we make 
things that wear out sooner than they would have to if we used our technology to make them last longer; we design 
them in such a way that they are extremely hard (and expensive) to repair, and we change designs so often that after 
a few years they cannot be repaired at all."); Tamara R. Piety, “Merchants of Discontent”: An Exploration of the 
Psychology of Advertising, Addiction and the Implications for Commercial Speech, 25 Seattle U. L. Rev. 377, 419 
(2001), available at http://www.law.seattleu.edu/lawrev/vol25/252/252.html (noting the prevalence of planned 
obsolescence and questioning whether it is fueled by producers or consumers); Louis E. Wolcher, Symposium: 
Technology, Values, and the Justice System: The End of Technology: A Polemic, 79 Wash. L. Rev. 331, 344 (2004) 
(associating planned obsolescence with technological totalitarianism). 
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The term “planned obsolescence” is neither a contradiction in terms nor an oxymoron in the 
consumer electronics industry.  Like hamsters, tens of millions of American consumers have 
blithely but cheerfully fallen into the “software treadmill”114 trap, repeatedly buying new 
computers from companies like Gateway and an “endless series of software upgrades”115 from 
Microsoft.116  This industry-contrived replacement cycle is in some cases “outpacing” Moore’s 
Law.117  One technology commentator has gone so far as to describe this personal computer 
obsolescence as “not only planned,” but “extolled by marketers as the principal virtue of 
machines designed to save labor and entertain.”118 
The time has come for judges to take notice of this marketing strategy in probing the 
temporal reasonableness of noncompete agreements in the consumer electronics industry, and 
perhaps others.119  While it would be a major setback to the industry for a court to rule that 
noncompetes should parallel planned obsolescence projections in duration, such judicial savvy 
and innovation might help make industry marketing more transparent to consumers and 
democratize the playing field between employer and employee in the drafting of noncompetes.  
Not only is planned obsolescence of products a dubious business practice,120 but judicial 
recognition of planned obsolescence could ultimately jeopardize noncompetes in that industry.  
This is a heavy hammer that a court has yet to wield. 
An astute judge might further recognize that Moore’s Law might have been an 
unintentional stimulus for the post-1965 planned obsolescence race.  As companies have “rushed 
to keep ahead” of Moore’s Law, his prediction has become a “self-fulfilling prophecy.”121  
                                                
114  Markoff, supra note 86, §4 at 6. 
 
115  Id. 
 
116  See Steve Bickerstaff, Shackles on the Giant: How the Federal Government Created Microsoft, Personal 
Computers, and the Internet, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 30 n.177 (1999) (discussing planned obsolescence in the personal 
computer industry). 
 
117  Markoff, supra note 86, §4 at 6. 
 
118  Id.  For a perspective on how producers drive to provide more advanced technology to beat out their 
competitors, see Bickerstaff, supra note 116, at 30 (stating “[t]he continuous pressure on personal computer users to 
upgrade or replace their systems or applications, and the need for help in mastering and maintaining the increasingly 
complex, powerful, and multifunctional personal computers, has created a sense of frustration in many users.”); 
Wolcher, supra note 113, at 343-44 (arguing that “planned obsolescence . . . keeps . . . [the technological subject] 
working overtime to replace things that are already outmoded almost the day they leave the store” and suggesting it 
is a “technological kind of totalitarianism [which] coordinates social behavior through the manipulation of needs and 
aspirations by vested interests”).  
 
119  Porcher Taylor first called for courts to consider planned obsolescence in determining the reasonableness of 
noncompete agreements in Porcher L. Taylor, III, The Bite Could Be Out of Noncompete Clauses, Inside Bus.: The 
Richmond Bus. J., March 11-17, 2002, at 16. 
 
120  For a hypothetical case study on the business ethics dilemma of using research and development funds to 
deliberately introduce product obsolescence of a new product to ensure potentially lucrative replacement sales, see 
James A. Heely & Roy L. Nersesian, The Case of Planned Obsolescence, Mgmt Acct., Feb. 1994, at 67; James A. 
Heely & Roy L. Nersesian, More Responses to Ethics Case, Mgmt Acct., June 1994, at 60. 
   
121  Yang, supra note 83, at 38. 
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Judicial recognition of that fact could make time calculations in noncompetes more of a science.  
The concept of planned obsolescence of products could help quantify the time duration of certain 
noncompete agreements.  Since a court has yet to fashion a time duration formula for a high-tech 
noncompete agreement, the EarthWeb line of cases reflects judicial supposition regarding the 
appropriate temporal parameters for noncompete agreements.  Testimony by experts on Moore’s 
Law and pretrial discovery of planned obsolescence strategies would shed great light on what a 
time duration formula should look like. 
Trial court judges should define the time parameters of noncompete agreements with 
planned obsolescence in mind, despite what industrial economists say.122  Industrial economists 
have argued that product decline and rapid innovation are preferable to enduring products and 
slower innovation.123  While this argument may make economic sense, it should have no 
significance in determining the reasonableness of noncompetition agreements.  In fact, expert 
testimony to this effect would set up a litigation ambush for employers: to justify enforcement of 
a noncompetition agreement the employer would risk exposure to antitrust liability.  Critics point 
to planned obsolescence as an indictment of capitalism, arguing that many products are designed 
to have “uneconomically short lives,” with the “intention of forcing consumers to repurchase too 
frequently.”124  The theoretical corollary to this argument would imperil most employers: 
“wastefully short durability is the cost imposed by the durable goods monopolist to overcome the 
time consistency problem.”125  This statement is the prevailing view in industrial economics 
scholarship.126 
Economic models indicate that monopoly producers have an incentive to lower the price 
of some products over time in order to “price discriminate”: first to charge a higher price to those 
that value a product the most and then to sell to other buyers at a lower price later.  If the planned 
pattern of price reductions is expected, however, buyers who would otherwise pay a high price 
will delay their purchases, knowing that the price will be lower in the future.  To avoid this, 
sellers want to convince buyers that they will not lower prices in the future.  But there is a 
problem of time inconsistency, because after they have sold their goods at a high price with a 
promise not to lower prices in the future, they have an incentive to lower the price to attract the 
remaining buyers who have lower reservation prices.  The monopolist must contrive a way to 
credibly commit that it will not lower prices in the future.  One way to do so is to lease the 
product.  If prices are lowered in the future, then the monopolist is hurt, since it owns the good 
                                                
122  Arthur Fishman et al., Planned Obsolescence as an Engine of Technological Progress, 41 J. Indus. Econ. 
361, 361 (1993) (noting arguments by industrial economists that planned obsolescence of products may be essential 
to technological development). 
 
123  Id. 
 
124  Id.    
 
125  Id., citing the prevailing view of several industrial economics scholars since 1981. 
 
126  Id.  For a fascinating theoretical study of why some industries such as automobile manufacturers, textbook 
publishers, and personal computers have too strong an incentive to utilize planned obsolescence, see Michael 
Waldman, A New Perspective on Planned Obsolescence, 108 Q.J. Econ. 273, 273 (1993).  For further discussion of 
durable goods monopolies and the incentives for such monopolists, see Barak Y. Orbach, The Durapolist Puzzle: 
Monopoly Power in Durable-Goods Markets, 21 Yale J. on Reg. 67 (2004). 
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that is flooding the market.  Another method is planned obsolescence.  If buyers must purchase 
new versions of a product every few years, the seller can more effectively commit to maintaining 
the high price, since inter-temporal price discrimination becomes less feasible if all buyers must 
return to the market often.  Revising textbooks every two or three years is one variation of this 
strategy.127  Because this strategy raises antitrust concerns, it will not likely be the focus of 
employer efforts to derail the use of planned obsolescence to calculate the temporal 
reasonableness of a noncompete agreement.  What makes economic and market sense does not 
necessarily pass judicial muster. 
If planned obsolescence is truly alive, well and profitable, then employers will be hard-
pressed to convince courts that they should be allowed to capitalize on that profitability at the 
expense of their employees by drafting noncompete agreements devoid of a planned 
obsolescence clause.  Planned obsolescence and trade secret longevity are diametrically opposed.  
Employees who change jobs, voluntarily or involuntarily, should not be made victims of a 
business practice that eviscerates the value of products and employee knowledge.  Courts cannot 
and should not validate the questionable market strategy of an entire industry that deliberately 
manipulates the value of proprietary information through planned obsolescence.  The judicially-
imposed corporate “tax” on planned obsolescence should be the downsizing of noncompetes. 
Planned obsolescence is a predatory abuse of contract jurisprudence by the consumer 
electronics industry.  Artificially manufacturing demand for products through planned 
obsolescence128 is anathema to social and contract fairness.  Seemingly, Microsoft (with its 
excessive upgrades in its software)129 and Gateway (with its excessive cosmetic improvements in 
computer hardware), both purveyors of the planned obsolescence of their products,130 would be 
likely targets of the judicial limitation of noncompetes.  This would provide one penalty for 
employers who deliberately create short product cycles.  Not only would synchronization of 
planned obsolescence and noncompetes provide greater predictability and fairness for employees 
and employers, but it would also discourage businesses from manipulating consumers with 
planned obsolescence techniques.131 
An additional public policy reason supports limiting noncompetes based on planned 
                                                
127  We are indebted to Associate Professor of Economics Erik Craft of the University of Richmond Robins 
School of Business for this elucidation of the concept of time inconsistency. 
 
128  See Deborah W. Post, Dismantling Democracy: Common Sense and the Contract Jurisprudence of Frank 
Easterbrook, 16 Touro L. Rev. 1205, 1215 (2000). 
 
129  For an intriguing theoretical economics analysis of a monopolist’s incentives to provide upgraded versions 
of its software, see Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, The Neo-Luddite’s Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the 
Software Industry, 31 Rand J. Econ. 253, 253 (2000). 
 
130  See Post, supra note 128, at 1215 & n.27 (noting Gateway’s marketing strategy of planned obsolescence); 
cf. Orbach, supra note 126, at 95 (discussing planned obsolescence in the software industry). 
 
131  If some companies are going to play the planned obsolescence game, then their employees who are 
unreasonably restricted by noncompetes should be allowed to migrate to other employers that would benefit 
consumers by releasing products withheld from the market in the interest of planned obsolescence.  This will 
provide a Silicon Valley effect, creating knowledge spillover that could minimize the deleterious impact of planned 
obsolescence on consumers.  See Gilson, supra note 16, at 584-86 (discussing the positive effects of knowledge 
spillover in Silicon Valley enabled by California’s refusal to enforce noncompete agreements). 
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obsolescence.  Planned obsolescence is a business strategy which is associated with the durable 
goods monopolist.132  While the strategy may be the subject of antitrust complaints, such cases 
are difficult to prove.133  Planned obsolescence in practice may be hard to distinguish from 
product changes with legitimate origins.134  Consumer demand may drive businesses to change 
products in limited ways and such changes are not intended to exclude competition 
unlawfully.135  Limiting the use of noncompetes based on planned obsolescence may benefit the 
public by allowing employees to escape to potential competitors, thereby increasing competition 
and limiting the market power of the durapolist.  Thus, both consideration of the employer’s 
need for the noncompete and consideration of public policy support restricting noncompetes 
where the employer utilizes planned obsolescence. 
In determining the enforceability of noncompetition agreements, courts should use the 
planned obsolescence of products to determine the presumptive reasonableness of the time 
dimension of the agreement.136  Courts should decline to enforce noncompetes that extend 
beyond the obsolescence of the product on which the employee worked, unless the employer 
shows that the employee has knowledge about a future iteration of the product that justifies a 
longer restriction.  In no event should a court enforce a noncompete that exceeds the length of 
the product cycle.  The product cycle should be the outside limit of any reasonable restriction.  
Further, planned obsolescence affects the utility of trade secrets.  An employee should not be 
restricted from working for a competing employer based on the likelihood of inevitable 
disclosure of trade secrets where planned obsolescence on the part of the employer devalues the 
trade secret subject to disclosure.137 
The maximum reasonable limitation of the product cycle would provide some certainty to 
both employers and employees with respect to the enforceability of covenants, thereby 
diminishing litigation.  Even with these limitations, however, there may be disagreement 
between employers and employees with respect to the length of the product cycle or employees’ 
acquisition of valuable information about the new product iteration, requiring judges to evaluate 
the conflicting evidence when covenants are litigated.  This raises the question of judicial 
competence to evaluate complex technological evidence, which is addressed in Section IV. 
 
 
                                                
132  Orbach, supra note 126, at 90-95. 
 
133  See id. at 90-100.  
 
134  See id. at 97-98.  
 
135  See id. at 98.  
 
136  While the time value of confidential information possessed by the employee has certainly been a factor in 
high-tech cases decided to date, creation of a presumption would standardize the use of obsolescence making 
judicial interpretation more predictable for the parties.  This greater certainty regarding judicial enforcement would 
aid drafters of such agreements and enable employees to assess with greater reliability the likelihood of enforcement 
of a restriction. 
 
137  See PepsiCo v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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IV.  THE TECHNICAL COMPETENCE OF JUDGES TO EVALUATE THE REASONABLENESS OF 
NONCOMPETES USING MOORE’S LAW AND PLANNED OBSOLESCENCE AS TIME DURATION 
CONSTRUCTS 
 
A.  Traditional Law School Education Does Not Prepare Future Judges to Adjudicate Complex 
Technology Cases 
 
While applying an axiom like Moore’s Law might not require a sophisticated 
understanding of technology, determining the rate of obsolescence of technology products, 
particularly where the issue is disputed, might present a challenge to judges without 
technological expertise.  Aspiring judges are not offered science and engineering courses in law 
school.  The mere mention of Moore’s Law would cause head scratching by many law school 
students, lawyers and judges in the nation.  Short of a paradigm shift in law school curricula, this 
educational deficit will likely continue. 
At the inception of the new millennium, American law schools still primarily follow the 
legal teaching path of Langdell.138  Every lawyer and judge in America has been schooled in this 
traditional manner.  “We learn law by studying what has gone before.”139  Change in the law 
occurs incrementally.  However, with the vast technological change currently occurring, every 
legal doctrine is potentially in the cross-hairs of fundamental change.  No legal doctrine is sacred 
in this transformational era.  Courts are straining at the oars of stare decisis. 
The Internet, Napster, the human genome project and nanotechnology could redefine 
intellectual property and even the Constitution.  Newer, unimagined technologies on the horizon 
could make this assault even more lethal to today’s precedent.  This “law-forcing,” “where 
technological change is so dramatic as to cause doctrinal reform,”140 has been a catalyst for 
American law schools to offer cyberlaw and technology courses.  Indeed, over 150 such courses 
were being taught at law schools in 2000.141 
Most complex high-tech cases involve intellectual property, a traditionally small practice 
and constantly fluid practice area that most law schools do not require as part of their core 
curriculum.142  Many lawyers never studied intellectual property in law school and most have not 
focused their practice in the field.  While the study and practice of cyber law is growing, the 
majority of federal judges were over “forty at the time the Internet first hit the public market.”143  
                                                
138  Alan Heinrich et al., At the Crossroads of Law and Technology, 33 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1035, 1035 (2000). 
 
139  Id. 
 
140  Id. at 1036. 
 
141  Id. at 1048.  Loyola of Los Angeles School of Law was among the first to develop a Law and Technology 
Program to better prepare both law and technology students to face the legal and social implications of technological 
change.  The program previewed a potential interdisciplinary course that would bring together science-engineering 
students and law students “to train them to resolve novel legal issues arising from advanced technology.”  Id. at 
1050.   
 
142  Debra Baker, Learning High-Tech at the Bench, 86 A.B.A. J. 52, 53 (2000). 
 
143  Id. at 54. 
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The senior jurists on the United States Supreme Court, who range in age from 55 to 83, “came of 
age at a time when doing legal research meant reaching for a book, not a mouse.”144 
“Among the justices, no one has given more thought to the relationship between law and 
science than Justice Breyer.”145  In this “age of science,” Breyer posits that the nation “must 
build legal foundations that are sound in science, as well as in law.”146  Moreover, he has 
suggested that justices on the high court need to know both science and the law in order to make 
sound decisions.147  In the context of noncompetes, from law students to the high court, Moore’s 
Law, which devalues the utility of product information, should become part of the legal 
landscape.148 
When parties opt to select their own expert witnesses under Federal Rule of Evidence 
706(d),149 judges may need Teflon robes to avoid the potential for technology “hazing.”150  In 
trade secret cases,151 a judge “bogged down” by technology might be reluctant to believe that the 
facts at issue are general knowledge in the industry.152  By overwhelming the judge with the 
complexity of the technology, the employer seeking protection from competition may be able to 
persuade a judge that “all of the technology is proprietary.”153 
In law school, students learn the wisdom of reasoning and arguing by analogy.  They are 
trained to “search intently for the closest available factual precedent.”154  While our legal system 
is predicated on argument by analogy, this style of analysis reaches the “limitations of analogical 
                                                
144  Linda Greenhouse, Microsoft Will Test Justices’ Prowess, N.Y. Times, June 4, 2000, § 3 (Money and 
Business), at 1. 
 
145  Id. 
 
146  Id. (quoting Justice Breyer from his 1998 speech to the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science, which he lauded for a study on expanded roles for court-appointed experts). 
 
147  Id. (paraphrasing Justice Breyer’s statement in a 2000 speech at a Cambridge biomedical research 
symposium). 
 
148  John Riedl, Law, Policy, and the Convergence of Telecommunications and Computing Technologies 
Conference, 2001 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 1, 39 (2001) (stating that Moore’s Law is one of the two most 
important laws that any law student will learn in legal education). 
 
149  Fed. R. Evid. 706(d). 
 
150  Baker, supra note 142, at 55. 
 
151  In referring to trade secret cases here, we include cases involving noncompetition covenants where the issue 
is whether the employer has a protectable interest or whether the duration of the time restriction is reasonable based 
on the changing technology. 
 
152  Id.   
 
153  Id. (quoting Nicole Engisch, the assistant chair of the intellectual property and information technology 
section of Minneapolis’ Leonard, Street). 
 
154  Joseph W. Rand, What Would Learned Hand Do?: Adapting to Technological Change and Protecting the 
Attorney-Client Privilege on the Internet, 66 Brook. L. Rev. 361, 373 (2000). 
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usefulness” when it clashes with the “uniqueness” of a technological change.155  For example, 
nanotechnology might well be a unique technology that is quite difficult to analogize.  
“Analogical reasoning plays a profoundly important role whenever a court must decide the 
proper legal rules to apply to a new technology.”156  The odds are high that a court will create 
“bad law” because courts “usually stumble” before they find the “correct” analogy for new 
technologies.157  Examples of analogical misdirection abound.  Consider that “[s]oftware stored 
in read only memory was not understood to be the same as software stored on disk.”158 
The Supreme Court fell into this analogical maze in Denver Area Educational 
Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC.159  In that case, the Court declined to use the 
traditional First Amendment analysis when confronted with a constitutional challenge to the law 
regulating the communications medium of cable television and instead conducted a “fact-
intensive” review.160  The court declined to categorize cable television using traditional First 
Amendment jurisprudence because of the rapid rate “of change within the cable industry and the 
communications field generally.”161  Thus, advancing technology requires not only additional 
education, but a rethinking of traditional analysis by judges. 
 
 
B.  The Judiciary Begins to Overcome the Steep High-Tech Learning Curve: Reno v. ACLU and 
Microsoft 
 
Before hearing their first Internet case in 1997, the Supreme Court justices were 
instructed by their library staff on how to use the Internet and the basic technical matters at issue 
in Reno v. ACLU.162  Thus “empowered,” the court in Reno unanimously overturned the federal 
law regulating Internet indecency and established the importance of free speech principles in the 
new medium.163  Most significantly, scholars and practitioners accept Justice Scalia’s suggestion 
                                                
155  Id.   
  
156  Jonathan Wallace & Michael Green, Bridging the Analogy Gap: The Internet, the Printing Press, and 
Freedom of Speech, 20 Seattle U. L. Rev. 711, 720-21 (1997). 
 
157  See id. 
 
158  Id. 
 
159  518 U.S. 727 (1996). 
 
160  Rand, supra note 154, at 373-74 (commenting on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Denver Area Educ. 
Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (addressing a first amendment challenge to the Cable 
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act)). 
 
161  Heinrich, supra note 138, at 1045 (citing Justice Souter’s concurrence in Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. 
Consortium).  
 
162  Greenhouse, supra note 144, at 1 (referring to a speech by Justice Breyer in 2000 at a symposium on 
biomedical research in Cambridge, Massachusetts about Reno v. FCC, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)). 
 
163  Id. 
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during oral argument regarding the rapid pace of obsolescence in cyberspace:164 
 
This is an area where change is enormously rapid.  Is it possible that this statute is 
unconstitutional today, or was unconstitutional 2 years ago when it was examined 
on the basis of a record done about 2 years ago, but will be constitutional next 
week? . . . Or next year or in two years?165 
 
Justice Scalia’s “sentiments were not new,”166 however, because the district court in Reno 
“put the point sharply.”167  “Because of the rapidity of developments in this field, some of the 
technological facts we have found may become partially obsolete by the time of publication of 
these Findings.”168 
Rapid technological change perplexes courts at all levels,169 especially with the Internet, 
where a year alone can encompass enormous change.170  In United States v. Microsoft Corp.,171 
federal district court Judge Thomas P. Jackson was swimming upstream in a tide of 
technological changes and confusions.  In reviewing his grant of a preliminary injunction, his 
findings of fact were criticized by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia “for 
confusing the concepts of operating systems and platforms for hosting software applications.”172  
Yet once the historic trial began, the Judge was credited with a quick study of the technical 
jargon utilized by the parties.173  Judge Jackson was also praised for efficient and effective 
administration of the seventy-eight-day trial.174  One commentator suggests that he “may very 
well be the model for technophobic judges thrust, often unwillingly, into the digital age.”175 
                                                
164  Stuart M. Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts and the Appellate 
Process, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 269, 270 (1999). 
 
165  Transcript of Oral Argument, available at 1997 WL 136253, at *49, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) 
(No. 96-511) (lamenting the abrupt change in relevant facts underlying the Internet between the district court 
findings and the appellate process to the Supreme Court). 
 
166  Benjamin, supra note 164, at 294. 
 
167  Id. at 295. 
 
168  ACLU  v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 838 n.12 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 
169  Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1275, 1280 (2002) (citing rapid 
technological change laments by the Second and Ninth Circuits). 
 
170  See id. at 1279. 
 
171  84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999). 
 
172  Baker, supra note 142, at 52. 
 
173  Id. 
 
174  Id. 
 
175  Id. 
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C.  The Role of Court-Appointed Technology Experts in Calculating Obsolescence Timelines 
 
In the Microsoft case, Judge Jackson had a living aid in the form of a special master who 
was a visiting professor at Harvard Law School and well regarded in the then emerging field of 
cyberlaw.176  The special master’s job was not to issue an advisory opinion, but rather to sort out 
the complex facts for the educational benefit of the judge.177  Indeed, generalist judges are poorly 
equipped to decide complicated technological questions178 without substantial self-education and 
external educational support.179  The Supreme Court, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., commanded that under Federal Rule of Evidence 702,180 “[t]he trial judge 
must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but 
reliable.”181  The federal courts may utilize experts, including expert witnesses, technical 
advisors, and special masters, to assist them in evaluating the evidence.182  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist emphasized that this responsibility is one of a “gatekeeping” role in the evaluation and 
                                                
176  Andrew J. Glass, Professor in Microsoft Case to Make Mark on Cyberlaw, Atlanta J. & Const., Jan. 8, 1998, 
at F5. 
 
177  Id., citing Mike Godwin, a cyberlaw expert at the Media Studies Center in New York. 
 
178  LeRoy L. Kondo, Untangling the Tangled Web: Federal Court Reform Through Specialization for Internet 
Law and Other High Technology Cases, 2002 UCLA J.L. & Tech. 1, 3 (2002), available at 
http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2002/01_020309_kondo.pdf. 
 
179  As far as judicial education initiatives, the National Judicial College should be lauded for its course on 
scientific evidence and expert testimony.  NJC Courses: Scientific Evidence and Expert Testimony, at 
http://www.judges.org/courses/course_dates/2004/Course.2003-09-08.5402 (last visited May 27, 2004).  “The 
National Judicial College's chief objective is to improve justice through national programs of education and training 
directed toward judicial proficiency, competency, skills and productivity.”  The National Judicial College: History 
of Achievement, at http://www.judges.org/about.  Affiliated with the American Bar Association, “[t]he National 
Judicial College is the country’s leading judicial education and training institution.”  Id.   
 
180  Fed. R. Evid. 702 states: 
 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) 
the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the 
facts of the case. 
 
181  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (establishing a new role for federal judges 
as gatekeepers of good science and reversing summary judgment in a birth defects case because the judge had failed 
in that duty by erroneously holding that "general acceptance" of principle underlying scientific evidence was a 
necessary precondition to admissibility under Federal Rules of Evidence).  The Daubert court established a new test 
for the reliability of scientific evidence, one which is flexible but based on the scientific validity of the principles 
underlying the evidence proffered.  Id. at 594-95, 597. 
 
182  Kondo, supra note 178, at 7.  See also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149 (1997) (Breyer, J. 
concurring) (noting that judges can appoint special masters and specially trained law clerks in cases involving 
complex scientific issues). 
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admission of scientific evidence.183 
Regarding the call for courts to consider product obsolescence in cases involving 
enforcement of noncompete agreements, federal judges can be faithful to the letter and spirit of 
Daubert by appointing experts in product and trade secret obsolescence.  While the cycle of 
planned obsolescence may be evident from discovery of company documents, disputes about the 
future utility of employee product knowledge may require technical expertise to unravel.  One 
advantage of using a court-appointed expert is “to resolve conflicts in the ‘battle of the 
experts.’”184  Since court-appointed experts are subject to deposition and to cross-examination 
upon being called to testify in court,185 their use would help democratize this approach to 
calculating the timeline of product and trade secret obsolescence.  The employment of court-
appointed expert witnesses under Federal Rule 706 is not a judicial fad.186  A Federal Judicial 
Center survey revealed that 20% of responding judges had used a court-appointed expert witness 
under Rule 706187 and 87% of the 431 judges thought such experts were likely to be helpful in 
certain cases.188  Equally compelling, a Harris poll survey discovered that a substantial 
percentage of federal and state court judges supported the use of independent experts in cases 
involving technical or scientific issues.189  Indeed, Federal Rule of Evidence 706 provides courts 
with substantial discretion in appointing expert witnesses.190  As an alternative to the use of 
court-appointed experts, the court might request videotaped tutorials from the lawyers or an 
independent expert or experts agreed to by both parties.191  Such steps could ensure that judges 
avoid becoming “amateur scientists,” a caveat espoused by Chief Justice Rehnquist in 
                                                
183  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600-01 (Rehnquist, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice Rehnquist 
cautioned, however, that judges need not become amateur scientists in order to perform that role. Id. at 601. 
 
184  Kondo, supra note 178, at 79. 
 
185  Fed. R. Evid. 706(a). 
 
186  For an excellent example of the use of a court-appointed expert in a case involving computer technology, 
see Computer Associates Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 712-14 (2d Cir. 1992) (upholding district court’s use of 
appointed expert in copyright case involving computer codes despite general rule limiting the use of experts in 
copyright cases because court recognized the need for experts in such complex technical cases). 
 
187  Kondo, supra note 178, at 79-80 (citing Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert’s 
Invitation: Defining a Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 Emory L.J. 995, 1004 
(1994)). 
 
188  Id. (citing Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Federal Judicial Center, Court Appointed Experts: Defining 
the Role of Experts Appointed Under Federal Rule of Evidence 706, at 11 (1993)). 
 
189  Id. at 80 (citing Symposium, Judges’ Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and Federal Trial 
Judges Who Spend at Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 731, 741, tbl. 3.6 (1989) 
(finding that 76% of 200 federal judges polled and 70% of 200 state judges polled advocated the utilization of 
independent experts). 
 
190  Id. at 78; Fed. R. Evid. 706. 
 
191  Baker, supra note 142, at 54-56. 
 




This would especially be a noteworthy caveat in the context of a nanotechnology case.  
Currently, the patent examiners at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) are having 
trouble understanding the “unique aspects of nanotechnology inventions.”193  Consequently, in 
2002 PTO examiners asked a group of nanoscientists to provide tutorials on various 
nanotechnology subjects, to assist them in understanding nanotechnology and the patents they 
were evaluating.194  Thus, nanotechnology may present the ultimate challenge for judicial 
competency in the high-tech realm.  Since one commentator opines that nanotechnology may be 
more “fad” than reality,195 judges may need to have court-appointed experts discern the truth or 
fiction of nanotechnology trade secrets and their obsolescence dates.  Unquestionably, 
technological fictions cannot be recognized as trade secrets. 
While actions relating to post-employment restrictions involving diverse parties may be 
brought in federal court,196 many such claims will be litigated in state courts.  Many states have 
provisions similar to Rule 706 which allow court appointed experts.197  In states without an 
express provision in the rules, it is likely that judges have common law authority to appoint 
independent experts.198  Moreover, more than twenty states have adopted the Daubert test for 
admission of scientific evidence, while a significant minority of the states still utilize the Frye 
test which was rejected by the Supreme Court in Daubert under the Federal Rules.199  Thus, the 
state courts, like the federal courts, can utilize technology experts to assist in determining the 
appropriate length of noncompetes. 
 
 
V.  BUSINESSES NEED TO DRAFT PRODUCT AND TRADE SECRET OBSOLESCENCE CLAUSES IN 
NONCOMPETE AND CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENTS 
 
Obsolescence significantly limits the lawful reach of post-employment restrictions on 
competition and disclosure.  If judges begin to utilize obsolescence to evaluate noncompetition 
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196  See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995); EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 
299 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
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and nondisclosure agreements for enforceability,200 it will encourage businesses to incorporate 
the concept when drafting such agreements.  The effect on employers may vary by state, 
however.  In states that allow the court to modify unreasonable restrictions, employers may 
continue to draft covenants without accounting for obsolescence, knowing that they may be 
altered by the courts.  Judicial guidance may still be of benefit to employees in such states (and 
employers who want to hire them despite the covenant), enabling them to predict the likely 
duration of enforceable restriction.  In states where the covenant must be enforced as written or 
not at all, employers may include in their agreements a provision limiting the restriction based on 
planned obsolescence, while reserving the right to enforce the restriction for the full time period 
specified if employee knowledge so warrants. 
Wise employers will incorporate the concept of obsolescence in drafting noncompetition 
and confidentiality agreements without judicial coercion.201  Employers should equate the length 
of post-employment restrictions with the life cycle of the valuable information to which the 
employee is exposed as a result of employment.  Certainly this might necessitate revising 
agreements as employees change jobs within the company.  The cost of revision should be offset, 
however, by the more predictable enforceability of the agreements.  As the enforcement of 
agreements becomes more predictable, litigation is likely to be reduced.  
Obsolescence could be incorporated in the agreement in one of two ways.  The first 
alternative is to determine the period of time that the employee's knowledge would remain useful 
to a competitor and limit the restriction’s duration accordingly.202  Thus, if the product on which 
the employee worked had a one-year life cycle, a one-year restriction would be appropriate. But 
suppose the employee left after six months of work.  Although the product would be obsolete in 
six months, the presumption that a one-year noncompete is appropriate would still apply.  Given 
the lead time necessary to develop a product, we would presume that the employee had begun to 
obtain information about the next product in the cycle sufficient to justify the one-year 
restriction.  The employee would retain the option of either negotiating with the employer to 
agree to enforce the restriction only for six months, if indeed the employee’s useful knowledge 
was limited to the existing product, or to compete and risk litigation.203  If the employer sought 
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to enjoin the employee from competing, the employee could seek to rebut the presumption of 
reasonableness with evidence that the useful knowledge extended for six months only and thus, 
only a six-month restriction would be appropriate.  
The second alternative would be to include a clause that ties the restriction expressly to 
the obsolescence of the technology used or known by the employee, either with or without an 
express duration clause.  While the lack of an express duration clause might limit predictability 
to some extent, employees sufficiently knowledgeable about an employer's product to justify 
such a restriction are likely to have adequate knowledge of the product's life cycle to understand 
the probable length of the restriction. 
Employers reluctant to include obsolescence clauses in their agreements should consider 
providing severance pay equal to pre-termination income to employees for the term of their post-
employment restriction.  This would greatly reduce litigation since employees would not suffer 
economic deprivation during the period of the noncompete.204  Notably, the court in EarthWeb 
supported its decision by noting the “onerous terms” of the agreement, which consisted of at will 





Obsolescence has become increasingly important as the United States has moved to the 
high-tech economy.  Rapidly changing technology affects the utility of employee knowledge and 
must be taken into account by both employers and judges in determining the appropriate 
restrictions on employment with competitors.  Predictability and fairness will be increased by 
using obsolescence, both planned and predicted, as a guide to reasonable time duration for post-
employment restrictions.  Further, where the time value of knowledge is in dispute, judges 
should use technology experts as aids in determining the appropriate balance of employment 
restrictions that will provide necessary protection to employers to encourage innovation, yet not 
unnecessarily prevent employees from earning a living based on their expertise.  Such an 
approach will reduce litigation and encourage employers to draft reasonable restrictions, 
benefiting both employers and employees in today’s high-tech workplace. 
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